



## SUMMARIES

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**ANDREJ ANGRICK**

**POWER GAMES: THE GERMAN NATIONALITY POLICY  
(VOLKSTUMSPOLITIK)  
IN CZERNOWITZ BEFORE AND DURING THE BARBAROSSA  
CAMPAIGN**

This paper deals with the influence of the various European powers and interest groups in Czernowitz, capital of the Bukovina, focussing on the time of the Second World War. Although Czernowitz was and still is being regarded as a tolerant town with a diverse culture, this paper shows that after the collapse of the k.u.k. monarchy it was more a place of coexistence than of togetherness, especially when nations like the USSR and Romania considered the Bukovina as a part of their confederation and set off corresponding political and national campaigns, while the Jewish ethnic group wanted to maintain its independence and the Ukrainians planned for the Bukovina to be part of a future nation state. Germany, being the successor in reign in Austria and the representative of the ethnic German minority living in the Bukovina, was also interested in the region as part of a Greater German empire. At the beginning of the Second World War and the annexation of Czernowitz and the North Bukovina – Germany did not agree – by the Soviet Union within the framework of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact, this constellation entered a new phase when the formerly verbally pronounced political opponent was then being attacked vehemently – arrest, deportation and political murder became part of the political instrument for a “conflict resolution”, while diplomatic approaches often arising from a powerful position of one ethnic

group with regard to another one having a European Great Power as an ally in the background showed only limited success.

During a first phase the constellation led to a sovietisation of the North Bukovina and to the flight of the main part of the Romanian population as from summer 1940. The ethnic German minority was relocated to the Warthegau (after a national-racial reliability testing). In the course of this measure the “Reich” in turn tried to extend its network of agents in the Bukovina (in the run-up to the planned attack of the USSR), thus establishing contact with the Ukrainian national movement.

The second phase started with the attack of German and Romanian troops and a fast conquest of the North Bukovina. A very particular constellation occurred in July 1941, though, because on the one hand Germany and Romania were allies, but on the other hand the “Reich”, especially the special unit 10b of the task force and their national traditions expert Prof. Fritz Valjavec, secretly locally cooperated with the Ukrainian nationalists, the pronounced opponents of Romania. Besides eliminating the Soviets, Romania’s policy was equally directed against their main competitor, the Ukrainians, who they wanted to expel in order to create a “Romanised” zone. In contrast, the Romanian course of action against the Jewish share of the population was only rudimentarily distinctive at first, while the special unit 10b was arresting the better part of the Jewish population and had hundreds of people executed. A conflict between the allies started. Romania felt cheated by the special unit 10b, which was looking for a closing of ranks with the local OUN-underground due to the lack of Romanian action concerning the Jewish population, while the national Ukrainians, competing with Romania, hoped to be perceived as independent allies. In the end Romania prevailed because of Hitler’s decision not to establish an independent Ukraine – both Czernowitz and the Bukovina would have been part of it – the pact of the German military to continue the passage at arms with Romania and due to special unit 10b leaving Czernowitz. In the aftermath of this conflict the paramilitary representatives of the OUN in particular only got to withdraw to Galicia which was occupied by Germany, while the Bukovina was integrated into Greater Romania. Having thus eliminated the Ukrainians, the Romanian side acted against the Jewish population group, being also an obstacle in the

process of implementing the concept of a “racial” homogeneous living space, because they were not Romanian. The establishment of a ghetto for 50,000 people can be considered as a first significant measure. Although Germany preferred the policy of extermination, it was interested in this measure, too, as the economy of the Bukovina would have come to a standstill, if the Jews had been totally eliminated. However, the bulk of the Jewish population was deported in batches from the ghetto to Transnistria as from autumn 1941 and then increasingly as from early spring 1942. The Romanian mayor, Dr. Traian Popovici, helped to prevent the deportation of just under 20,000 Jews to the ghettos in the East, although the Eichmann staff member H.Stuf. Gustav Richter wanted this group to be taken into account with regard to the overall deportation plannings of the “final solution”. After the Red Army had recaptured the Bukovina, Czernowitz arrived at the last phase of the war. The Romanian population fled, the OUN again did not succeed in establishing themselves there even while the Germans were retreating; for the Jewish population Czernowitz meant nothing more than a transit place on their way to the USA or Israel, German traditions having not been existed since 1940. Thus Czernowitz was transformed into a town of the victorious USSR, neither having a minority problem nor cultural diversity any longer. It is not until after the collapse and the split-up of the Soviet Union that Czernowitz comes into our field of vision again out of the periphery – the Ukrainian city council not only wanting and supporting this because of touristy considerations – as a multicultural experiment whose failure during the Second World War is a lesson to the metropolises of the present.

### **KAREL C. BERKHOFF**

#### **«TOTAL ANNIHILATION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION». THE HOLOCAUST IN THE SOVIET MEDIA, 1941–1945**

The article challenges the widely held idea that during the war with Nazi Germany, the Soviet media were silent or deliberately vague about the Nazi campaign of mass murder against the Jews of Europe, known today as the Holocaust. It mainly aims to answer the following question: between

June 1941 and May 1945, how and when did the Russian-language Soviet press and radio that was directed at the Soviet hinterland (Soviet territory not, or no longer, occupied by Germany or its allies) report, distort, or ignore the Holocaust?

First the author argues that Stalin had no lack of information. Then follows a look at the relatively well-known published statements by prominent Jews: the Jewish Antifascist Committee and Ilya Ehrenburg. Those statements by Soviet Jews in Russian-language publications *did* say, although not always emphatically, that all the Jews of Europe were being killed. The section “Reporting Soviet Jews and Ignoring Other Jews” deals with the period until December 1942 and shows Stalin’s involvement, no later than January 1942, in stripping Nazi Germany’s Jewish victims of their Jewishness; but also and a lingering inconsistency in application of this line, even among Soviet leaders. Meanwhile, Jews in Europe who were not Soviet citizens were generally ignored. The month of December 1942 was an interlude: a time of comparative centrality of Jews as victims combined with a temporary Ukrainianization of victims. From early 1943, a new development began: Soviet-Jewish victims were identified as Jews far more rarely than before, but the Soviet Russian-language media now often identified Jewish victims in Poland and elsewhere beyond the Soviet Union as Jews. For instance, the author found a statement in *Pravda* in November 1944 that 1.7 million Jews were murdered in Birkenau.

The article concludes that there was a tendency to conceal the Jews, but not a *policy*. If Soviet readers and radio listeners *wanted* to know, there able to find references to a campaign of mass murder specifically against Jews. The main reason for the tendency, the article argues, is antisemitism, in two senses. Antisemitism was a tendency within the Central Committee, and it was a mindset among Soviet citizens who, Stalin believed, reacted favorably to Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda and actions.

The main sources are the newspapers *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, *Krasnaia zvezda*, and *Trud*, and documents in the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (fond 558 [Stalin]; fond 17, opis 125 [Department of Propaganda and Agitation]) and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (fond 6903 [Radio Committee of the USSR]; fond 8114 [Jewish Antifascist Committee]).

## JOACHIM NEANDER

### THE «HIDDEN CURRICULUM» AND TRANSFER PROBLEMS IN HOLOCAUST EDUCATION

Holocaust education (HE) stands out from all pedagogic measures ever undertaken in history. Never before a subject of teaching has been a matter of international concern worldwide, and never before a subject of teaching has become mandatory under international law for a still growing number of countries. The paper presents the aims of HE as expressed in the resolutions of international institutions and looks critically at their realization in the field of teaching, focusing on the classroom, since first, attending school is mandatory for children worldwide, and second, only for HE at schools, guidelines and detailed instructions do exist.

The aims of HE are very ambitious: to promote tolerance and to eliminate all forms of hatred, bigotry, racism and prejudice in society; to combat antisemitism and Holocaust denial; to help prevent further acts of genocide — for short: “to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past.”

In practice, these ambitious aims, crystallized into teaching objectives of a formal curriculum, often collide with the “hidden curriculum” — the totality of all the messages communicated by the organization and operation of schooling apart from the official or public statements of school mission and subject area curriculum guidelines. Practice shows that, in conflicts, the hidden curriculum always wins. In addition, HE is only one of many players in the zero-sum game of weekly hours allotted to the ten to twelve teaching subjects a high school student is confronted with. And last but not least, HE meets other, often conflicting narratives told by the agents of primary socialization, such as family, friends, youth groups, or religious institutions, whose influence does not end when the school bell is ringing.

Examples are given which show that societies putting much stress on HE are by far not more tolerant — or less racist, xenophobic or antisemitic — than others with little or no HE. The reason for this is seen in the fact that HE does not touch the sources of these unquestionably undesirable attitudes:

group think, religion, nationalism, and unequal access to vital commodities. Even the hope that nations and their elites may “learn from history” through HE seems illusory. As already Hegel has shown, the only thing we can learn from history is that we don’t learn from it. The example of “lessons learned from the Holocaust” leading to diametrically opposite behavior toward Israel should be a serious warning.

So what can we really expect from HE? Certainly a decrease in the susceptibility to Holocaust denial and an increase in the sympathy for Jews and their cause; moreover, a feeling among those whose nations were not under immediate or imminent attack by Germany that their ancestors fought a just war seventy years ago. But what about creating a better society, fundamentally changing age-old (and possibly genetically encoded) human behavior? First, Holocaust educators should be moderate, leaving these high-flown goals within the realm of preambles and concentrate on that which is attainable at their working place. Second, and that is most important, they should act according to the “Taxi driver concept in education”: *Pick the kid up where it is standing*. They should begin with cases of intolerance, racism, etc. that directly touch the kids in their *present* lives, and then show, taking the Holocaust as a historic example, where such attitudes *can* (but must not!) lead. Only then a lasting effect, a “transfer” from one learning domain (the Past) to another (the Future) can be expected. HE done this way will not change society as a whole, but it can help to make individuals think, to reflect their attitudes, and so to improve social life on the micro level. It is an aim worth the effort.