

SUMMARIES

JOHAN DIETSCH

STRUGGLING WITH A «NUREMBERG HISTORIOGRAPHY» OF THE HOLODOMOR

This article outlines and traces some of the developments and effects of some aspects of the historiography of the Holodomor, first developed in North America in the 1980s, which under the enchantment of the totalitarianism theory often argued for at least equating the crimes of Hitler with those of Stalin. In so doing, a «Nuremberg historiography», where the explanation relied on an intentionalist-conspiracy interpretation of the 1932–1933 famine, was more or less consciously produced. Most importantly however, such an interpretation also meant that blame and responsibility was more or less confined to the absolute top of the political leadership and not to the actual perpetrators. In the house of the hanged little attention was paid to the rope.

Employing concepts of genocide and making the Nuremberg trial into an ideal with which to cope with the Ukrainian tragedy has entailed difficulties. For some scholars and politicians the conspiracy aspects have completely taken over and been used to explain and further bolster the image of Ukraine as a victimised nation. Others have simply called for the truth or historical justice to be established. Adherence to the ideal of truth is shared by history and justice, but in practice it differs greatly. Submitting the 1932–1933 Ukrainian famine to mainstream genocide studies would undoubtedly turn the black and white Nuremberg historiography into shades of grey, much more difficult to digest by Ukrainian historical culture.

DIANA DUMITRU**IN THE MAZE OF POLITICIZATION:
HOLOCAUST STUDIES IN MOLDOVA'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS**

History is undergoing a serious politicization in the Republic of Moldova. This article brings to attention the topic of the Romanian Holocaust in Moldova's schools, which vividly exemplifies this politicization. After 2001, when the Communist Party came to power, the Romanian Holocaust provoked heated debates among Moldovan historians. The voices of Holocaust deniers became predominant in historical circles after 2001 and, despite the public's interest in the Romanian Holocaust, it did not make its way into the history curriculum of schools. The explanation relates directly to the confrontation that has been taking place between historians and the incumbent government. The core of this dispute can be reduced to different visions held by these groups as to the appropriate national identity of the people of Moldova. The fight for these opposing visions has been transplanted onto the school system and the field of history.

The subject of the Holocaust was consciously co-opted and instrumentalized by the administration in its attempt to impress European audiences and marginalize the pro-Romanian model of identity that had dominated the pre-2001 period. Meanwhile, the majority of Moldovan historians chose to challenge the interests of the Communist government on this subject and, for that reason, deliberately avoided the Holocaust in their teaching and research. The state of affairs in Moldovan secondary schools reflects very much this unhealthy situation. When facing the issue of Holocaust studies, school teachers oscillate between their wish to support their professional colleagues and the fear of provoking the anger of the Ministry of Education. Interviews with history teachers conducted in Spring 2006 demonstrate the existence of a passive resistance to the authority's instructions to promote Holocaust studies in secondary schools. Partially, this attitude is shaped by the teachers' belief that the fate of ethnic Moldovans should predominate in study of Moldovan History, but in general teachers chose to reject the study of the Holocaust in Romania because they think it will «damage the national cause» of creating one national identity between Romanians and Moldovans, and will improve the situation of the Communist government. Although they recognize the excessive politicization of this topic, they nevertheless saw the solution as not the de-politicization of this subject, but its complete avoidance.

ALEKSANDR KRUGLOV

THE NUMBER OF JEWS EXTERMINATED BY THE EINSATZGRUPPEN IN 1941–1943

Mobile units of Security police and SD, better known as Einsatzgruppen, are the topic of many publications mainly by Western authors. These articles comprise issues connected with the formation of these groups, their structure and composition, objectives they had to complete, their activities, their cooperation of the with the Wehrmacht. Much less attention is given to the «contribution» of the mobile units into the «Final solution of the Jewish question», especially concerning the total number of victims of the Einsatzgruppen, including the Jewish victims. The article concerned aims at responding to this issue.

Among the sources of the article are German and Soviet archive documents and materials, especially the so-called «reports on events in the USSR» (Ereignismeldung UdSSR) – generalised messages on the activities of the Einsatzgruppen and -kommandos, separate reports by the Einsatzgruppen, reports by the German military commandants' offices, mentioning actions by the Einsatzgruppen, materials of the trials on former members of the Einsatzgruppen. Since the aforementioned documents do not reflect all the actions by Einsatzgruppen, other documents and materials are employed to reach the final aim, namely documents of the Soviet Extraordinary Commissions on the crimes of occupants and their helpers.

The article analyses the results of actions not only by the four Einsatzgruppen (A, B, C, D), but also by less known units, such as the mobile unit of special destination (Einsatzgruppe z.b.V.) (acting in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia mainly in July–August 1941), Stapostelle Zichenau–Schröttersburg and Stapostelle Allenstein. The latter two were active in July–September 1941 in Bialystok region incorporated into the USSR in 1939–1945.

Basing on the analysis of the numerous documents and materials, the author comes to the conclusion that Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D exterminated over 630 thousand Jews, the mobile unit of special destination (Einsatzgruppe z.b.V.) – over 20 thousand, Stapostelle Zichenau–Schröttersburg – about 18 thousand and Stapostelle Allenstein – about 2 thousand.

VLADIMIR SOLONARIETHNIC CLEANSING OR CRIME PREVENTION?:
DEPORTATION OF ROMANIAN ROMA
TO TRANSNISTRIA IN 1942

The article questions emerging consensus in Romanian and Western historiography concerning the deportation of Roma to Transnistria in 1942. According to this consensus, deportation of Roma was a personal decision of the Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu and did not reflect, as it was in the case of Jews, the long-standing animosity of the Romanian public towards this ethnic group. The major impetus for deportation was Ion Antonescu's personal prejudice against Roma whom he saw as prone to criminal behavior. Consequently, only Roma whom Antonescu considered especially «dangerous» – i.e., itinerant and those with criminal record – were subject to deportation. This policy, however, was not seen positively by the Romanian public, and protests from different quarters ensued. As a result, the deportations were stopped in October 1942. Contrary to this view, the article argues that anti-Roma prejudices were very widespread in Romanian society, that violent anti-Roma discourse was common to Romanian eugenics and that some of Ion Antonescu's closest advisers were also violently anti-Roma because they considered these people as being of a «low biological value». Deportations were enthusiastically carried out by Romanian gendarmerie entrusted with this task and generally gendarmes tried to deport as many Roma as possible. Protests against deportations were weak to non-existent and did not influence the government's policy; the decision to stop the deportations was a result of changing foreign policy orientation and its main intended beneficiary were Jews. Roma benefited from this decision «by association» only.